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@ Itamar Peretz
2025-05-24 06:51:24
I see what you’re getting at, but that XOR-mempool idea tackles a different problem. Issue #32372 scrambles the local mempool file, so if someone seizes your laptop, they can’t read raw TX data at rest. It doesn’t touch the blocks we relay and store forever. Once an unlimited-length OP_RETURN is mined, every node keeps the clear-text payload in blk*.dat — no XOR, no masking.
So the question remains: do we let an attacker slip a single 800-byte (or 8 kB) illegal blob into one output, or do we make them break it into >520-byte chunks and pay more fees/hassle? Keeping the limit below 520 keeps that barrier in place without forcing anyone over to Taproot tricks. I still like a modest cap, even if mempool-at-rest gets encrypted.